Since I'm pursuing a degree in cybersecurity, this one caught my attention.
In March, the FCC added foreign-produced consumer-grade routers to its Covered List. These are routers primarily intended for residential, commercial and industrial use and installed by the customer.
The FCC cited compromised home and small-office routers being used for network surveillance, data theft, botnets, credential attacks, and as proxies to conceal the actual source of malicious traffic. The FCC also cited activity associated with Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, and Salt Typhoon.
What I found interesting is that the router itself doesn't have to be the ultimate target. Once compromised, it can become infrastructure for additional attacks while the traffic appears to originate from a legitimate residential connection.
Since pursuing cybersecurity, threats involving ordinary network equipment have become a lot more interesting to me.
How many people actually consider the manufacturer or country of origin when choosing a router?
FCC Public Notice PDF
In March, the FCC added foreign-produced consumer-grade routers to its Covered List. These are routers primarily intended for residential, commercial and industrial use and installed by the customer.
The FCC cited compromised home and small-office routers being used for network surveillance, data theft, botnets, credential attacks, and as proxies to conceal the actual source of malicious traffic. The FCC also cited activity associated with Volt Typhoon, Flax Typhoon, and Salt Typhoon.
What I found interesting is that the router itself doesn't have to be the ultimate target. Once compromised, it can become infrastructure for additional attacks while the traffic appears to originate from a legitimate residential connection.
Since pursuing cybersecurity, threats involving ordinary network equipment have become a lot more interesting to me.
How many people actually consider the manufacturer or country of origin when choosing a router?
FCC Public Notice PDF